This article sheds light on the hub-and spokes model historically adopted by the United States of America to engage in bilateral arrangements. Additionally, it outlines how ever since Trump’s presidency, there are increasing concerns regarding the model as well as the traditional strategic partnerships of the US. Lastly, it also highlights the role and importance of India in these changing dynamics.
John Foster Dulles noted that these bilateral arrangements remain the most striking and enduring element of East Asia's security architecture. Scholars like Victor D. Cha argue this dominance stems from a deliberate 'power-play' rationale in U.S. postwar planning, designed to maintain U.S. influence and limit the sovereignty of its Asian partners in forming regional coalitions.
In the early stages of the Cold War, the hub-and-spoke system was considered essential for the United States' primary goal: halting the spread of communism in Asia amidst the emergence of the Soviet Union and China. Asia was deemed too diverse and politically fragmented for a unified multilateral strategy like NATO. To sustain its influence over regional security without empowering Asian countries to form independent coalitions, the United States instead forged a network of bilateral security agreements. This foundational hub-and-spoke system consisted of treaties with individual allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand.
Trump's rhetoric—questioning the value of NATO, suggesting allies like South Korea and Japan should pay substantially more for the U.S. military presence, and reconsidering the structure of the military itself—cast immediate doubt on these longstanding US commitments.
From 2017 to 2021, the "America First" strategy became a fundamental pillar of the U.S. international agenda. Trump's "America First" trade policy aggressively sought to reduce the United States' trade imbalance while boosting American manufacturing and jobs. This was accomplished through protectionism, including tariffs and trade renegotiations. Highlights included launching a trade war with China, withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), replacing it with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
The "America First" agenda severely impacted U.S. security partnerships, particularly with NATO and its military presence in Asia and Europe. Trump frequently chastised NATO Member States, demanding they increase defence expenditure to meet the alliance's 2% GDP benchmark. He questioned the effectiveness of collective defence, arguing that U.S. military deployments were too costly and prompting plans to reduce troop numbers in places like Germany and South Korea. Crucially, Trump urged allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, to significantly enhance their financial payments for U.S. military protection.
New conflicts also emerged in trade interactions. South Korea, emphasizing its low tariffs on American goods under a bilateral free trade agreement, requested exemption from the Trump administration's proposal to impose punitive tariffs on its trading partners. Similarly, Japan initiated talks with the U.S. to address the potential effects of President Trump's tariffs on their trade relationship.
The Trump administration's policies fundamentally tested, but ultimately did not dismantle, the United States' hub-and-spokes alliance system. While old alliances were strained, they were also forced to evolve: U.S. allies raised their defence commitments and explored alternative security relationships. Throughout this turbulence, India adopted a pragmatic approach, strategically leveraging U.S. engagement to improve its own regional status while carefully maintaining foreign policy autonomy. The long-term consequences of Trump's approach continue to impact U.S. foreign policy, compelling successive administrations to integrate bilateral commitments with growing multilateral policies in a rapidly changing global order.
Key initiatives include the potential sale of F-35 fighter jets to India, which would place it among the few countries permitted to purchase these cutting-edge aircraft. The two nations also decided to increase defence industry cooperation by co-producing ‘Stryker’ infantry combat vehicles and ‘Javelin’ anti-tank guided missiles in India. Discussions are progressing for a Reciprocal Defence Procurement agreement to promote more seamless defence commerce and technology transfer. Additionally, the Autonomous Systems Industrial Alliance (ASIA) was established to foster industrial collaborations in autonomous technologies in the Indo-Pacific area.
About the Author: Pranali Dhavan
This is a Crisis Watch policy brief, edited by Harshita Prashar.
The Hub-and-Spoke Foundation
Bilateralism and Cold War Origins
Since World War II, the United States established a distinct preference for maintaining bilateral security relationships over engaging in a unified multilateral arrangement, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Europe. This core bilateral structure is known as the hub-and-spoke model, with the US acting as the central 'hub' and its allies serving as the individual 'spokes.'John Foster Dulles noted that these bilateral arrangements remain the most striking and enduring element of East Asia's security architecture. Scholars like Victor D. Cha argue this dominance stems from a deliberate 'power-play' rationale in U.S. postwar planning, designed to maintain U.S. influence and limit the sovereignty of its Asian partners in forming regional coalitions.
In the early stages of the Cold War, the hub-and-spoke system was considered essential for the United States' primary goal: halting the spread of communism in Asia amidst the emergence of the Soviet Union and China. Asia was deemed too diverse and politically fragmented for a unified multilateral strategy like NATO. To sustain its influence over regional security without empowering Asian countries to form independent coalitions, the United States instead forged a network of bilateral security agreements. This foundational hub-and-spoke system consisted of treaties with individual allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand.
'America First' Shakes the Hub
Trump’s Foreign Strategy
Concerns over the future of these alliances surged in 2017 with the inauguration of Donald Trump and the launch of his "America First" foreign policy. This shift was immediately palpable during the trilateral summit involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States, the first high-level meeting since Trump took office.Trump's rhetoric—questioning the value of NATO, suggesting allies like South Korea and Japan should pay substantially more for the U.S. military presence, and reconsidering the structure of the military itself—cast immediate doubt on these longstanding US commitments.
From 2017 to 2021, the "America First" strategy became a fundamental pillar of the U.S. international agenda. Trump's "America First" trade policy aggressively sought to reduce the United States' trade imbalance while boosting American manufacturing and jobs. This was accomplished through protectionism, including tariffs and trade renegotiations. Highlights included launching a trade war with China, withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), replacing it with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
The "America First" agenda severely impacted U.S. security partnerships, particularly with NATO and its military presence in Asia and Europe. Trump frequently chastised NATO Member States, demanding they increase defence expenditure to meet the alliance's 2% GDP benchmark. He questioned the effectiveness of collective defence, arguing that U.S. military deployments were too costly and prompting plans to reduce troop numbers in places like Germany and South Korea. Crucially, Trump urged allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, to significantly enhance their financial payments for U.S. military protection.
The Stress Test: Cost-Sharing, Trade, and India
Alterations to the Hub-and-Spokes System
The trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea was complicated by the Trump administration's demands, specifically concerning cost-sharing for the US military presence, trade dynamics, and defence spending. The U.S. maintains a major military presence in both nations, but while Japan and South Korea have historically shared these costs under Special Measures Agreements (SMAs), the Trump administration signaled a desire to drastically expand these contributions, threatening to undermine decades of carefully negotiated stationing arrangements.New conflicts also emerged in trade interactions. South Korea, emphasizing its low tariffs on American goods under a bilateral free trade agreement, requested exemption from the Trump administration's proposal to impose punitive tariffs on its trading partners. Similarly, Japan initiated talks with the U.S. to address the potential effects of President Trump's tariffs on their trade relationship.
The Trump administration's policies fundamentally tested, but ultimately did not dismantle, the United States' hub-and-spokes alliance system. While old alliances were strained, they were also forced to evolve: U.S. allies raised their defence commitments and explored alternative security relationships. Throughout this turbulence, India adopted a pragmatic approach, strategically leveraging U.S. engagement to improve its own regional status while carefully maintaining foreign policy autonomy. The long-term consequences of Trump's approach continue to impact U.S. foreign policy, compelling successive administrations to integrate bilateral commitments with growing multilateral policies in a rapidly changing global order.
India's Strategic Pivot (February 2025)
By February 2025, India’s strategic relationships with the United States and its East Asian allies had undergone substantial transformation, marked by expanded strategic partnerships, enhanced defence collaborations, and a collective commitment to Indo-Pacific stability. A highlight was the introduction of the ‘U.S.-India COMPACT (Catalysing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st Century’ by President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This agreement aims to deepen collaboration across technology, trade, and defence.Key initiatives include the potential sale of F-35 fighter jets to India, which would place it among the few countries permitted to purchase these cutting-edge aircraft. The two nations also decided to increase defence industry cooperation by co-producing ‘Stryker’ infantry combat vehicles and ‘Javelin’ anti-tank guided missiles in India. Discussions are progressing for a Reciprocal Defence Procurement agreement to promote more seamless defence commerce and technology transfer. Additionally, the Autonomous Systems Industrial Alliance (ASIA) was established to foster industrial collaborations in autonomous technologies in the Indo-Pacific area.
Conclusion: The Quad and the Future of the Indo-Pacific
As the Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape continues its dramatic shift, India and its allies are now crucial in counterbalancing regional difficulties. The Quad alliance—comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia—remains essential for advancing a rules-based system and guaranteeing maritime security. Recent high-level discussions have reiterated the commitment of these countries to work closely together to address contemporary security issues, signaling that the US-led system, though tested, is actively re-calibrating towards a more flexible, network-based security architecture anchored by rising strategic partners like India.References:
- Ikenberry, John G. “American Hegemony and East Asian Order.” (http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2005/2005readings/Ikenberry2004%20AmH egEA.pdf)
- Cha, Victor D. “Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia.” *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Winter 2009/10): 158-196.
- Acharya, Amitabh. “Why is there no NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism.” (http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/1049__Why_No_Asian_Nato_FI NA L.pdf)
- Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia, Yasuhiro Izumikawa 2020 (https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/2/7/95263/Network-Connections-and-the-Emergence-of the -Hub)
- "Foreign policy of the first Donald Trump administration." Wikipedia. Last modified March 4, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_first_Donald_Trump_administra tion.
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- Victor D. Cha, “Power play: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Winter 2009/10): 158-196
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94 (1): 7–23.
- White House. "Fact Sheet: The Trilateral Leaders' Summit at Camp David." The White House, August 18, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders summit-at-camp-david/.
- Sneider, Daniel C., Sohn Yul, and Soeya Yoshihide. “U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateralism: A U.S. Perspective.” Special Report no. 59. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2016. https://www.nbr.org/publication/u-s rok-japan-trilateralism-a-u-s-perspective/.
- BURDEN SHARING Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/united-states-india-joint-leaders-statement/
- Tellis, Ashley J. “How India Sees the US: Trump and Beyond.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/13/how-india-sees-us-trump-and-beyond-pub-82916.
- Pant, Harsh V., and Kashish Parpiani. “Indo-US Ties Under Trump: Delivering on a Bipartisan Consensus?” ORF Occasional Paper, no. 177 (January 2020). https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-us-ties-under-trump/.