This essay is an exclusive feature from the inaugural issue of The India Way- 'Unquiet Neighbourhood: What is the future of South Asia?'

About the Author: Bandish Oza


A Policy Analyst at the Centre for International Security and Economic Strategy, Bandish Oza is also pursuing an MA in International Relations at King’s College London, and has contributed to a book chapter on diplomacy and terrorism with IISPPR, with his research interests including cultural diplomacy, information warfare, and soft power in the Indo-Pacific.


The Mumbai Taj Hotel: site of the 26/11 terror attack

Introduction

A putative understanding of terrorism dictates that it permeates ideologies, alliances, and most importantly, borders. In the Indian case, cross-border terrorism has been a clear and present threat ever since the nascency of the modern Indian state in 1947, when Pakistani militants launched what would become the first of decades-long unrelenting series of cross-border terrorist attacks against India. In dealing with thousands of micro and macro aggressions from Pakistan-based/sponsored terrorists spanning nearly eight decades, Indian counterterrorism has constantly undergone theoretical, practical, and structural changes in what is often described as a case-to-case episodic approach. In so doing, India has shown remarkable restraint, often forced by diplomatic/bureaucratic constraints, with limited success in inciting deterrence as well as in holding the culprits accountable.

However, every major terrorist attack after 2016 has been met with a decisive and immediate military response from India, marking a significant departure from the gun-shy counterterrorism policy up until then. The recent Operation Sindoor has established a heretofore unprecedented benchmark in Indian counterterrorism, establishing a zero-tolerance doctrine propelled by military-kinetic force complemented by escalations on the diplomatic and economic fronts. This essay will study the evolution of Indian responses to cross-border terrorism as well as the bureaucratic and diplomatic constraints it faces, with reference to three pivotal attacks i.e., 26/11, Uri, and Pahalgam.

Lead-Up To 26/11 – Dogmas of Delhi

In order to understand India’s responses to terrorism, it is important to first establish an overview of the intensity and recurrence with which terrorist incidents occurred in the nation. Between the years 2000 and 2008, India faced more than 15,000 terror-related incidents of killing, which resulted in more than 9,000 civilian fatalities. Roughly half of that is attributable to cross-border terrorism stemming from its neighbour to the North-West. Major attacks include the attack on the State Legislative Assembly Complex in Srinagar (2001), the Akshardham Temple attack (2002), the Mumbai twin blasts (2003), the Delhi bombings (2005), the Mumbai train bombings (2006), the Samjhauta Express bombing (2007), and many more.

Each of these attacks was dealt with on a case-by-case basis, focusing on domestic security and law enforcement actions such as rescue and relief operations, investigations and prosecutions within India. All these measures were defensive, reactive, tentative and episodical, chasing low-level disposable individuals rather than targeting their leaders or backers. Despite finding clear links to Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, India never took any diplomatic or military action against them or their Pakistani backers, exposing a remarkable lack of established doctrine to not only prevent future attacks but also to pursue and punish their cross-border linkages.

Constraints on Indian responses were twofold. Firstly, India was a growing economy still adjusting to the 1991 economic liberalisation and wrestling with over a decade of political instability. This created a massive deficit in both political will as well as economic strength to invest in a military or diplomatic standoff with its irritant neighbour and its terrorist proxies.

Moreover, its military was still recovering from the 1999 Kargil War, adding to the hesitation of the nation’s political leadership to engage in kinetic responses, especially cross-border interventions. Secondly, the biggest preoccupation of India’s diplomatic cadre in the first decade of the millennium was securing a nuclear deal with the US. The economic and diplomatic benefits of the nuclear deal evidently took precedence over engaging in a protracted diplomatic confrontation with a rogue nation.

26/11 and ‘Dossier Diplomacy’

The Mumbai attacks in November 2008 were the first pivotal moment in India’s counterterrorism policy, as exigent circumstances overwhelmed India’s aforementioned reservations. In a torrent of diplomatic measures, India “officially handed over dossiers to Pakistan containing evidence against the mastermind… Hafiz Saeed…”, allowed a Pakistani judicial commission to investigate the matter in India, and repeatedly submitted several judicial requests asking for the arrest and prosecution of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) commanders. Moreover, India rallied the international community to its support, exposing the state

sponsored nature of the attack. Several LeT collaborators from outside Pakistan were arrested in their host nations, while others were put on sanctions and terror lists by the UNSC because of India’s international outreach, isolating Pakistan at the global stage.

The then foreign secretary of India, Shivshankar Menon, explains in his book Choices why India did not resort to kinetic options, enumerating all the potential downsides of a military confrontation, ranging from ineffectiveness to possible escalation, and a better chance of success with diplomatic/judicial alternatives. However, retrospectively, this ‘dossier diplomacy’ not only failed to deter Pakistan from conducting further terrorist attacks but also left the national humiliation unanswered and the sacrifice of the victims unavenged, all the while having no deterrent effect on future attacks. LeT leadership in Pakistan remained unscathed, and international isolation of Pakistan faded with no long-term consequences for either the terrorist organisation or its sponsor-host nation.

Despite still being defensive, reactive, tentative, and episodic, this response was a definite improvement on previous ones as it managed to internationalise the issue of cross-border terrorism and exposed the Pakistani role in fostering it. Most importantly, it created a benchmark for future responses, one that India can build on and escalate when another attack should inevitably occur. It also exemplified India’s generous restraint, choosing not to escalate into a broader conflict despite incurring heavy loss of life and property in the pursuit of long-term peace and regional stability.

Uri and the Emergence of ‘New India’ Doctrine

A watershed moment in Indian counterterrorism occurred with the deadly Uri attack in September 2016, which claimed the lives of 19 Indian soldiers. Soon after the attack, the Indian army launched surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC), putting Indian boots in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for the first time ever outside war, eliminating terror launch pads of LeT and JeM along with the masterminds, handlers, and terrorists residing in them.

This significant escalation in India’s fight against terrorism saw it not only crossing the de facto border but also for the first time resorting to military action outside its own sovereign jurisdiction, inflicting heavy loss of life and property not only to individual terrorists but also their leadership and operational infrastructure. Public discourse about this military response revolved around the emergence of a “New India” that will not capitulate to terrorism, but give befitting replies, be it diplomatically, politically, or militarily, echoing the sentiment expressed by PM Modi in his aforementioned statement.

This was the beginning of a new doctrine of counterterrorism, where no subsequent attack shall go unanswered and unpunished, so much so that after the Pulwama attack in February 2019, a military response was not just possible but rather widely anticipated. The anticipations were not unfounded as India carried out air strikes on terror facilities in PoK and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions. Response to Pulwama solidified the doctrine set after Uri, that every act of terrorism will be met with a commensurate, immediate and punitive military response.

It proved to Pakistan and the world that surgical strikes after Uri were not an isolated incident but the commencement of the ‘New India’ doctrine.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another sovereign state.  Thus, India’s military and air force strikes outside its sovereign jurisdiction fell under a grey area vis-à-vis international law. However, India’s justification was twofold. Firstly, Article 51 of the UN Charter dictates, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…” It is the same logic that Israel has been using in its ongoing conflict with Hamas. India argued that an attack on its military personnel at the hands of terrorists sponsored by Pakistan justified India’s use of force. Secondly, India argued that it did not threaten the territorial integrity of any sovereign state since its targets were non-state actors, which meant that the invocation of Article 2(4) was redundant.

Operation Sindoor

Pahalgam marked the deadliest terrorist attack on civilians in India in over a decade, claiming the lives of 26 tourists. The heinous nature of the attack, paired with its communal motivations, invited the largest military action India has ever carried out against Pakistan-based terrorist camps. Under Operation Sindoor, India struck 9 terrorist headquarters in not only PoK but also the Pakistani heartland province of Punjab with air and land-launched drones and missiles. This marked the first time India ever launched a military offensive on mainland Pakistan outside of the disputed PoK. “A high-precision, multi-domain offensive,” Operation Sindoor exemplified the evolution of India’s counterterrorism doctrine. 

It was complemented by various diplomatic and economic measures, most significantly but not limited to holding the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, drying up Pakistan’s biggest source of water supply. These diplomatic actions were backed by sensational political statements, such as PM Modi’s proclamation that India will pursue the culprits “to the ends of the earth.” 

However, the overarching response to Pahalgam under the umbrella term Operation Sindoor was pivotal for India’s counterterrorism doctrine in three ways:

  1. India vowed not only to attack the terrorists but also their backers, implicating and targeting Pakistani covert agencies and armed forces.

  2. India vowed not to be deterred by Pakistan’s ‘nuclear blackmail’ and struck military installations of a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), changing the narrative and operational dynamics for all future conflicts.

  3. India upgraded its ‘New India’ Doctrine by changing the terms of engagement, declaring any subsequent terrorist attack as an act of war.

India avoided global condemnation by providing massive caches of incontrovertible evidence that proved its precision strikes on vetted terrorist infrastructure, thus circumventing any allegations of attacking a sovereign state. Moreover, its subsequent strikes on the military installations of Pakistan were vindicated, firstly, as non-escalatory retaliation against Pakistani attempts to do the same first, and secondly, as an accomplice to terrorism, which once again invalidated their claim to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

The UNSC statement after the Pahalgam attack called for holding “the perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice.” India’s unrelenting efforts at internationalising the issue of Pakistani links to terrorism culminated in a near-total erosion of Pakistan’s credibility at the international stage, enabling India to carry out such massive strikes. This tainted reputation of Pakistan also ensured that much of the misinformation it propagated surrounding Operation Sindoor was discredited by the international community.

Conclusion

From silent condemnation and internal measures before 26/11 to the ‘dossier diplomacy’ after 26/11, to the ‘New India’ Doctrine after Uri, to massive upgrades to it after Pahalgam, India’s responses to cross-border terrorism have matured and evolved beyond recognition in the last quarter of a century. Escalating in political will, diplomatic intensity, as well as operational boldness, this evolution has been gradual but decisive, unwritten but unequivocal, and retaliatory but restrained. Earlier it was defensive, now it is offensive; earlier it was reactive, now it is retaliatory; earlier it was tentative, now it is authoritative; earlier it was episodical, now it is doctrinal. With this escalating trajectory, there is little doubt that future counterterrorist operations of India would be more lethal and damaging than the previous ones. However, the danger of climbing the ladder of escalation is burning its rungs, making it hard to climb down without a crash.

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