India’s neighbourhood is in a state of flux, not crisis. This difference has significant consequences, and there is an ideological difference between handling minor changes in the global order and adjusting to a new order altogether. India is still on its haunches, figuring out the distinction effectively. 


The Bangladesh Prime Minister’s adviser was detained at New Delhi’s airport a few days ago, where he was questioned by Indian immigration officials for several hours before being sent back. Zahed Ur Rahman, a senior official in the government, was travelling to attend a meeting hosted by India’s Ministry of External Affairs, but after being cleared, he decided to return to Dhaka instead of continuing with his scheduled engagements. Bangladesh held a strong reaction to the incident, summoning India’s Deputy High Commissioner to formally protest the unwarranted detention, while India remained silent on the matter. Tarique Rahman will make his first foreign trip as Prime Minister this week, travelling to Malaysia and then China. Although he has been in office for four months, Modi’s personal invitation to visit India remains unanswered. One cannot deny that Rahman’s itinerary is significant, highlighting deeper faults in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. He is scheduled to meet Xi Jinping and sign around fifteen agreements, including the Teesta river project, a second Padma bridge, and the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar road corridor stretching to Kunming. The Chinese Ambassador had earlier extended Xi’s personal invitation to Rahman, and the trip, which was initially planned for June and delayed briefly, is now set to take place. The incident of an Indian immigration officer questioning Bangladesh’s PM’s adviser, and Bangladesh’s PM choosing Beijing over New Delhi for his inaugural state visit, is an indicator of a relationship in flux.


High Commissioner to Bangladesh Pranay Kumar Verma met Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in Dhaka in April 2026

India has not dictated the course of this relationship, and the country has yet to find the right approach to steer it in a different direction. This complexity defines the tremors felt on the Eastern flank of India, a neighbourhood vital to India’s continued sustenance.

The diplomatic reset launched in April appeared to be sincere, prima facie. This was evident through Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s visit to New Delhi on 8 April, marking the first ministerial visit since the BNP government came to power, holding meetings with Jaishankar, NSA Doval, and Petroleum Minister Mr. Puri. Both sides emphasised the importance of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and beginning a new chapter in their relationship. The tone was positive, and the intention behind the reset appeared to be genuine. Between April and June, the relationship has been derailed twice by incidents that should have been manageable. Firstly, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma’s remarks on infiltrators, which Bangladesh found disparaging regardless of their political justification, prompted the summoning of India’s acting High Commissioner to the Foreign Ministry. Secondly, the unceremonious detention of the PM’s adviser at the airport, which Bangladesh deemed inconsistent with diplomatic norms, was not aptly substantiated by India, further poisoning the well. This gap is not new, but its cost is. Under the ousted Hasina, the bilateral relationship had sufficient institutional depth and personal investment at the top to absorb such incidents without consequence. In contrast, Tariuq Rahman must navigate a politically turbulent environment that rewards an anti-India posture and scrutinises any hint of proximity with India.

Consequently, every diplomatic plight becomes fodder for the narrative brewing in the country. The Rahman government’s actions, from the Foreign Minister’s April visit to the restoration of visa services to Indian citizens in February, signal its intentions. The cultural exchange efforts, referred to as “golgappa diplomacy”, also indicate a willingness to engage. Nevertheless, Tarique Rahman’s first foreign trip as Prime Minister will be to Malaysia and Beijing, and Modi’s personal invitation, extended in February, gathers dust. The Teesta water sharing issue, which Rahman has called a matter of national survival, remains stalled due to West Bengal’s domestic politics, and this hurdle cannot be overcome by goodwill from South Block alone. Looming over everything, Hasina’s presence on Indian soil, after being sentenced to death in absentia by Bangladesh’s courts, remains a crucial unresolved issue in the relationship between the two countries. India has four uncomfortable options: handing Hasina over to Bangladesh to face execution, helping her relocate to a third country, maintaining the current situation, which is damaging the relationship, or discussing the issue directly with the Bangladeshi government. By choosing to maintain the status quo, India is paying a price for this inertia, as is evident from the itinerary of Bangladesh’s first Prime Ministerial visit abroad.

On 1 June 2026, Narendra Modi welcomed Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing at Hyderabad House, a significant moment as it marked the President’s first international visit. The Tatmadaw’s decision to make India the destination of Min Aung Hlaing’s first state visit is surprising, given that China has been their main external patron since the 2021 coup. China has provided the Junta with diplomatic cover at the United Nations, supplied them with arms, and engaged with them economically, all while offering consistent political support throughout a brutal civil war that has claimed and displaced millions. Nevertheless, the Junta’s leadership chose to reach out to India, suggesting they were seeking to broaden their options and hedge themselves against absolute reliance on China. For New Delhi, this means that 5 years of sustained, pragmatic engagement have paid off as the country has managed to avoid the international isolation that Western sanctions and moral condemnation intended to inflict. By hosting the Junta on June 1, India was able to signal that it remains a viable alternative to Chinese dominance, and it sent a message to Beijing that its influence over Myanmar is not unconditional and can be challenged. China’s significant investments in Myanmar, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, oil and gas pipelines through Rakhine State, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, make strategic sense. These investments give Beijing direct access to the Indian Ocean, allowing it to bypass the Strait of Malacca and reach into India’s neighbourhood.

India’s engagement with Myanmar is, in part, a response to China’s growing presence, as the government in New Delhi is keen to influence the degree of access China has to Myanmar’s territory. The June 1 visit has not resolved the Kaladan issue. To achieve the 2027 operational target for the Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, working relationships with the Arakan Army, which controls the project’s corridor, are essential, whereas Naypyidaw’s assurances are limited by their lack of territorial control. India has maintained two open channels: a state-to-state engagement with Min Aung Hlaing, which has been elevated to a presidential visit, and a back-channel with the Arakan Army, established in Bangkok in January 2025. The dual-track approach is the most suitable architecture for this project. Its true effectiveness will be measured by its ability to establish a functional corridor by 2027, rather than by the diplomatic signals it sends to Beijing.

On 7 June, Jaishankar met with his Nepalese counterpart, which yielded significant outcomes, including the UPI-NPI payment linkage, handovers of health and cultural heritage projects, and a blueprint for railway meetings in Kathmandu to review progress on the Raxaul-Kathmandu broad gauge link. The discussions were marked by a warm tone, with Nepal’s Foreign Minister publicly acknowledging India as its most trusted partner, underscoring the strong bilateral relationship between the two nations. Ten days earlier, Nepal’s Prime Minister Balendra Shah made a significant statement in parliament, one that differed in tone if not in substance: the border dispute between India and Nepal is a two-way issue, with Nepal possibly holding land claimed by India, just as India holds land claimed by Nepal. This admission was remarkably candid. It also marked a shift in the political narrative that Nepal’s leadership is now adopting- one that is assertive yet non-confrontational, prioritising the language of sovereign equality over the outdated “special relationship” framework that implied a hierarchical dynamic between nations. Fortunately for India, its relationship with Nepal is structurally deep and cannot be easily superseded by Chinese infrastructure projects. The country’s open border, the flow of remittances, its economic integration, and the cultural ties that bind them through language, religion, and family are organic and will outlast any political friction. The Nepalese were keen to stress that Nepal is not choosing between India and China, but is instead looking to redefine its terms of engagement with India in a manner that accommodates its domestic political requirements. China is not replacing India in Nepal, but instead, it is making its presence felt across Nepal’s political landscape in areas where India’s government-to-government engagement has limited reach, including across parties, civil society, and through initiatives like scholarships and Confucius Institutes. The proposed Tibet-Kathmandu railway, which defies engineering logic but signifies deep strategic ambition, is a clear warning sign.

To counter this, India must deliver on its long-standing commitments to build infrastructure, such as the Raxaul-Kathmandu railway link, which has been pending for over two decades, and focus on making connectivity a tangible reality rather than just a promise. The recent review of the Raxaul-Kathmandu link during the railway meetings on June 11-12 is a move in the right direction. Nepal’s new vocabulary - equal partnership, sovereign engagement, and bilateral respect instead of bilateral dependency - is not a threat to India, but a welcome reminder of the changing diplomatic ties. A maturing relationship between unequal neighbours like India and Nepal requires this kind of vocabulary to be sustainable. India’s approach needs to be mature enough to view this change as an opportunity, not a provocation.

As we witness the three countries and three distinct trajectories, the incongruencies are astonishing. While Bangladesh sends its Prime Minister to Beijing, India detains their adviser at the airport; Myanmar’s President visits India despite the country’s most strategic territory being handled by India. If this wasn’t sufficient, Nepal’s Foreign Minister sees India as a trusted partner, but the PM opines on how a border dispute with New Delhi can be settled.

 The differences in the approach of the three nations are not just varied and uniquely disparate, but make one wonder what India is dealing with. 


The neighbourhood is in motion, with various groups moving simultaneously in different directions - some towards India and some away from it - and they were not waiting for India’s foreign policy to catch up with the developments that have gained momentum. The leadership of Tarique Rahman is a proposition India can ill afford. A Prime Minister who prioritises Beijing as his first foreign visit will inevitably complicate matters. India’s longstanding struggles with illegal immigration and infiltration from Bangladesh, where Muslims were often posing as Hindus, are inextricably linked to the nuances of bilateral diplomacy. The unresolved question of Hasina, coupled with provocative statements from state politicians, was creating strategic consequences that extend far beyond the routine gaps in institutional cooperation. Min Aung Hlaing’s move is an opportunity for India to take the lead. The Myanmar President’s choice of New Delhi for his maiden state visit sends a strong signal, which India should leverage by pursuing a dual-track strategy that connects engagement with Naypyidaw to dialogue with the Arakan Army and cooperation with the northeastern states, whose infrastructure and security are what this setup is designed to serve. Nepal’s new vocabulary is not a problem to manage, but an opportunity for both countries to build a strong relationship that their futures depend on. They must create a partnership that is genuinely equal, not just a diplomatic phrase, and they must deliver on infrastructure commitments that have been delayed for too long, which have led to a loss of trust. The neighbourhood is replete with turbulent winds of change, and India has the necessary weight, relationships, and diplomatic agility to keep up with it, as demonstrated repeatedly over the past eighteen months.

The neighbouring countries of India are experiencing a state of flux, rather than a crisis. This distinction is important because managing change demands a different set of skills and strategies than managing a crisis, and India is still getting to grips with making this distinction.



About the Author: Anvay Sheolikar
Anvay Sheolikar is a published author of Why Space Has Three Dimensions, a work that received recognition from faculty at IITs and IISERs, as well as from ISRO, NASA, ESA Directors, and DD News, among others.