What the Return of Hard Power Actually Means 

Hard power, in its classic sense, refers to the use of military force and economic coercion to achieve political objectives. And this is exactly what is happening in the current arena of international politics. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military expenditure reached $2.887 trillion in 2025, the eleventh consecutive annual increase. As a share of global GDP, military spending has risen from 2.4% in 2024 to 2.5% in 2025. Between 2016 and 2025, total global defence spending increased by 41%.

 A proposal for 114 additional Rafale fighter jets entered the active pipeline. (Photo by Daily Subah)

The most dramatic shift is happening in Europe. For decades, European nations depended on the American security umbrella. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US-Iran war, and the Trump administration's open contempt for NATO free-riders have now opened the eyes of Europe. European defence investments in 2025 grew by 14% more than all other continents, reaching €864 billion. In Europe, at the country level, Germany's defence spending rose by 23% in real terms in 2024 and by 18% in 2025, bringing its budget to €95 billion, double its 2021 level. Berlin has committed to further increasing its funding, projected to reach €117.2 billion in 2026 and €162 billion by 2029, equivalent to 3.2% of GDP. Alongside these military flashpoints, economic coercion has also become an equally sharp instrument to enhance hard power. The Trump administration has effectively weaponised commerce. Through its tariff regime, the United States targets allies and rivals alike based on trade balances and strategic calculations. This blurred the line between economic policy and foreign policy.

These numbers show that the world is rearming on a scale not seen since the Cold War, with a high budget. But the more major shift is not quantitative; it is qualitative. Governments are no longer treating military force as a last resort. They are treating it as a routine instrument of foreign policy. The two most important events in 2026 illustrate this shift with particular clarity. In January, U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in a large-scale military operation, a move that would have been unthinkable within the framework of the post-Cold War order. In February, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran and killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In retaliation, Iran expanded the conflict beyond Israel by targeting countries hosting American military forces across the Middle East. Iranian missiles and drones directly attacked Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. While U.S military installations and strategic assets in Iraq and Syria also came under pressure. These retaliatory attacks destabilised global energy markets and the post-Cold War liberal world order.

India Steps In: Operation Sindoor and Its Consequences

The shift towards hard power for India began on the night of May 7, 2025, when the Indian Air Force and Army launched Operation Sindoor in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack that killed 26 Indian civilians. The operation lasted 23 minutes. This was the first time since the Kargil War of 1999 that India used direct military force against targets on Pakistani soil. The message was explicit - India would no longer absorb cross-border terrorism from its western neighbour. This operation represented a fundamental shift in strategic posture. And the allocation of the defence budget for FY 2026-27 confirmed this shift. India's FY 2026-27 defence allocation represents a 15.19% increase over the previous year's defence allocation, amounting to Rs 7.85 lakh crore (approximately $93.5 billion). Capital expenditure for modernisation increased to Rs 2.19 lakh crore, with 75% of the acquisition budget reserved for the domestic industry. According to SIPRI data published in April 2026, India's military spending rose 8.9% to $92.1 billion in 2025, making it the world's fifth-largest military spender. The defence purchases made after Operation Sindoor were based on the lessons learned from the operation. As a result, India has provided significant funding for modern technologies like drone acquisition, counter-drone systems, and electronic warfare capabilities. Allocations for aircraft and aero-engines also rose by 31%. A proposal for 114 additional Rafale fighter jets, potentially India's largest-ever single defence contract, entered the active pipeline. The government also increased funding for infrastructure development closer to border areas. India's seriousness in spending on military modernisation and increasing defence budgets reflects its ambition for hard power.

How India's Hard Power Falls Short

India's military expansion is real; however, it must be assessed against the scale of the challenges it faces, and that assessment is concerning. The most significant gap is with China. India's $93 billion defence budget, although historically large, is less than a quarter of China's estimated $336 billion. Beijing has been modernising its military, new aircraft carriers, hypersonic missiles, and advanced cyber capabilities at an extraordinary pace and a growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean that directly challenges India's traditional maritime dominance in its own backyard. India is also facing a 'two-front threat,' a potential simultaneous military challenge. from China in the north and Pakistan in the west. India's current force structure and budget are not yet optimised to address both theatres comprehensively. India's total defense spending remains approximately 2% of GDP, well below China's, which constitutes a gap in security and a higher share of GDP.

There is also a structural problem with how India procures its military equipment. A typical defense contract in India takes three to four years to be finalized but the real problem runs far deeper. In India, defence procurement runs through multiple layers: the defence Acquisition Council, the defence Minister, the Finance Ministry, and, sometimes, the Cabinet Committee on Security. Each stage has its own timeline to finalise. Although the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 prescribes timelines to reduce delays and accelerate the procurement process. However, studies by MP-IDSA suggest that overlapping institutional responsibilities and dispersed decision-making continue to slow down the procurement process. There is little institutional pressure to move fast because there's no clear accountability when a contract lapses or a deadline slips. The evidence is hard to ignore. The Tejas fighter jet was approved in 1983. It entered service in 2019, 36 years later. The upgraded version, the Mk1A, was ordered in 2021. As of early 2026, the Air Force has not received a single one. The submarine program, Project 75(I), has been under discussion for over a decade, and a contract has still not been signed. In a world where opponents are acquiring new platforms at speed, such delays have real strategic consequences. So, in short, the bureaucratic red tape is real in defence procurement, but it's a symptom of a deeper institutional design problem rather than the root cause itself.

India's energy vulnerability adds another dimension to its hard power limitations. India is the world's third-largest oil importer and depends on imports for 88% of its crude oil. Before the crisis, the Strait of Hormuz solely accounted for approximately 45% of India's crude oil imports, 50% of its LNG imports, and 90% of its LPG imports. The US-Israel war on Iran led to the disruption of oil flows that hit Indian households directly. Many households returned to kerosene and wood. Restaurants in Mumbai closed. Gujarat's ceramics industry shut down.

The reopening of the strait should not be read as a resolution. Rather, it was a relief event within a structural ailment that remained unchanged. The same vulnerability exists today. Another conflict, another miscalculation, another set of sanctions, and India finds itself in the same position, scrambling for alternatives it does not have.

The Strategic Autonomy Problem

India's foreign policy has long been built on a doctrine of strategic autonomy, the idea that India should not bind itself to any single power or alliance. India would maintain relationships with everyone: the US, Russia, China, the Gulf states, Europe, and the Global South. It would be no one's adversary and everyone's partner. This doctrine was effective for decades, but 2026 showed that India is no longer sufficient to maintain it. The Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on Indian exports, with an additional 25% surcharge specifically linked to India's continued purchase of Russian oil. As a result, India entered 2026 as one of the most heavily tariffed economies in the world, despite being aligned with Washington through the Quad. This illustrates the limits of strategic independence at a time when major powers increasingly use economic and security partnerships as tools of strategic pressure.

The clearest evidence that strategic autonomy is compromised comes during US-Israel strikes on Iran, when India’s Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement expressing ‘deep concern’ and calling on ‘all sides’ to pursue dialogue. India completely ignored who launched the strike first, did not condemn the breach of Iranian sovereignty, and remained silent on Israeli and US actions. In March 2026, a US Navy submarine sank an Iranian vessel just 50 miles off Sri Lanka's coast, a ship that had just departed a naval exercise MILAN hosted by India. And India said nothing publicly. That silence was itself a statement, which is why Brahma Chellaney calls it a "strategic embarrassment" for Delhi. The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing in May 2026, with Putin visiting days later, signalled that the world's three most powerful actors are managing worldwide tensions among themselves. India was not at that table. And the most important incident happened in June 2026, when US aircraft struck the commercial oil tanker MT Settebello in the Sea of Oman and killed three Indian seafarers. In response, India did summon the US diplomat but stopped short of public condemnation or a demand for accountability. A country with genuine hard power does not stay silent when its citizens are killed in international waters by a partner nation. This silence is not diplomacy. It is the death of strategic autonomy and the ambition of hard power.

However, India is not a passive actor in the return of hard power. Operation Sindoor demonstrated genuine strategic resolve. The defence budget reflects serious intent. A 15% increase in a single year, with capital expenditure, signals that New Delhi understands the era it has entered. The diplomatic energy invested in BRICS, the Quad, the AI Summit, and free trade negotiations with the UK, EU, and New Zealand, cultivating partnerships, and refusing to be cornered into a single alignment shows a country that understands it must be present at every table. But there is a difference between being present and being powerful. Attending every summit does not translate into agenda-setting. Signing framework agreements does not project force. India's hard power is still constrained by budget ceilings, procurement delays, the China gap, and the structural contradictions of a foreign policy that tries to be all things to all partners.

These developments do not indicate that India is failing. Rather, India is currently at an inflection point: it is sufficiently large to be consequential, but not yet powerful enough to be indispensable. The gap between these two conditions is what the next decade of Indian strategic decisions must address.

About the Author: Amit Kumar Yadav

He holds an MA in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Hyderabad and is currently a Research Intern at the Sir Syed Center for International Relations & Risk Analysis (SSCIRRA).