Unpacking the Gold Rush
Deep-sea mining aims to extract valuable mineral deposits found on the ocean’s floor, hundreds to thousands of meters deep, where lay significant reserves of copper, nickel, cobalt, zinc, silver, gold, rare earth elements such as cerium and europium. These minerals are contained within potato-shaped polymetallic “nodules” —so called because these rocks contain traces of various types of minerals. They are also found in polymetallic sulfides, formed around hydrothermal vents on the ocean floor, and on underwater mountains.Credits: International Seabed Authority
These minerals and nodules are key ingredients in wind turbines, electronics, medical technologies, electric vehicles, and military infrastructure. Hence, companies and the countries backing these companies have been looking to tap the ocean floor for its millions of square kilometers of metal ores. While a majority of these minerals, which are found on land, have been overmined, and most of the “good stuff” has already been utilised; the minerals found underwater are usually enriched versions, and hence offer a highly concentrated source of critical minerals.
On the flipside, polymetallic nodules are found only on the ocean floor and are extracted from the surface of the seabed, along with top layers of sediment. It is this very action that has caused alarm amongst environmentalists, since the ecological consequences include habitat destruction, exacerbating effects on climate, and pollution.
Global distribution of critical minerals in deep sea (Credits: Frontiers)
Who Controls the Ocean Floor?
In the 1960s, American geologist John L. Mero published a book, ‘The Mineral Resources of the Sea’, in which he argued for the use of the seabed as a source for these critical minerals. In response, Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta delivered a speech at the United Nations arguing for the creation of a system of international regulation to prevent the technologically advanced countries from monopolising these resources, as well as to legally designate the ‘Area’ as “the common heritage of mankind”, to be “developed for the benefit of mankind as a whole”.In 1973, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in New York, but due to the large number of participants (over 160 nations), a consensus-building approach and intense debates, the conference lasted almost a decade, until 1982. The resulting convention, which was called “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, came into effect on 16th November, 1994, introducing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as state property 200 nautical miles from the coast of certain coastal nations. The ‘Area’ would not be mined until a mining code and sharing mechanisms on how to distribute the resources mined were set up. For this purpose, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was established. ISA‘s dual mission was to control the development of mineral-related operations in the ‘Area’ and to protect the ecosystem of the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil.
Current Exploration, Maybe Exploitation?
Under UNCLOS, activities on the ocean floor are of two types – exploratory and exploitative/extractive. However, these activities, while legally distinct under UNCLOS, increasingly overlap in practice. For example, ISA issues exploration contracts, which consist of data gathering, sampling, prospecting, testing of machinery, and reporting the Environmental Impact Assessment of the extraction to the Authority. These countries and private companies are not allowed to move to the exploitation phase in the absence of exploitation regulations. In reality, sampling and testing of machinery would mean breaking into the rocks containing these minerals, along with the seabed, leading to loss of subsoil of the seabed and disturbances to the ecosystem on the seabed. Thus, these practices are borderline exploitative, and would have the same impacts the ISA has been trying to prevent in the absence of a finalised Code.One might raise the question – “is it legal to mine the minerals found in a country's own EEZ?” Technically, yes – a country is allowed to mine, without needing the approval of ISA. However, this comes along with important legal caveats – the State must comply with the “international rules, standards, practices and procedures being developed internationally”, and ensure that the marine environment is protected and preserved. The domestic laws must be “no less effective” than the international standards, which does not currently happen, since there is no international code for mining established as yet. Moreover, if any adverse ecological impact were to arise, the State would be held legally liable to other countries under Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS, since the State is obligated to prevent transboundary pollution and not to endanger the marine biodiversity of neighbouring waters.
The Battle Over the Fine Print
Deep-sea mining regulations have been developed for decades, but most of this regulation was geared towards exploration. The system was running on an unwritten rule of only applying for exploration licenses, and then waiting for the final ‘Mining Code’ to be finalised before applying for commercial mining. Actual regulation for the same was officially started in 2014, which culminated in draft regulation being submitted in 2019 to ISA, and is still under negotiation.However, on 25th June, 2021, the island nation of Nauru notified the ISA of its intention to invoke Section 1(15) of the 1994 agreement, relating to Part XI of UNCLOS, which states “If a request is made by a State referred to in subparagraph (a) the Council (the 36-member executive body of ISA) shall, in accordance with article 162, paragraph 2(o), of the Convention, complete the adoption of such rules, regulations and procedures [for the Mining Code] within two years of the request”. This meant that any Member State, or any company backed by a Member State, could request the Council to complete the rules, regulations and procedures necessary to start commercial exploitation. This triggered the “two-year rule”, which required the ISA to finalise and adopt said regulations within 24 months, i.e. until 9th July, 2023. This was done so that the Canadian company The Metals Company’s (TMC) Nauruan subsidiary could start the extraction of minerals in the deep-sea.
However, many international legal scholars and environmental law groups came to a consensus that the deadline was not legally binding, that there is no work plan put in place, and that exploitation should not be carried out in the absence of rules, regulations, and procedures. Instead, the Council agreed to continue to negotiate the Mining Code, and set up a roadmap for the same. While initially set to be finalised in 2025, many deadlocks were not resolved, leading to multiple delays.
While that deadline is long gone, the fact remains that commercial exploitation is rapidly emerging as a reality. Most nations recognise the impact that owning such exploration contracts now possesses. The convergence of corporations' plans to tap into this vast source of minerals, the technology required to access these mineral deposits, and the geopolitics of capturing critical mineral supply chains all transform these exploration contracts into tools of “national security” and “global resource influence”.
What Does This Mean for India?
India currently holds three exploration contracts - one for exploration of polymetallic nodules (PNS), and two for polymetallic sulphides (PMS). Thus, India has carved for itself a unique position in this global race for seabed resources – a crucial player capable of securing its critical mineral supply chains and bolstering its green energy ambitions. India is also actively aligned with the ISA by being involved in the ongoing negotiations, and advocating for thoroughness over speed.While these contracts give India a seat at the geopolitical table, the systemic flaws within the ISA framework create a structural paradox that paralyses industrial growth. Since ISA remains stalled without a legally binding finalised Code, India cannot transition from exploration to full-scale commercial exploitation. India has been preparing maritime technology for this activity, under the Deep Ocean Mission. These include manned and unmanned submersibles like Matsya 3000, and underwater bots to conduct maritime surveys in the deep-sea environment. If the ‘Mining Code’ does not become operational in the near future, industries and private companies that manufacture such technology would hesitate before investing any more in such projects.
Currently, India also lacks the industrial base required to process these raw nodules and sulphides, which include activities like smelting and metallurgical refining. Without this processing capacity, India would have no choice but to send the retrieved minerals to foreign hubs in order to refine them. This would create a strategic paradox – India would be able to absorb the risks associated with deep-sea mineral extraction, but would have to surrender these raw inputs to foreign refineries such as China, which currently dominates the world’s hydrometallurgical processing. This would neutralise the sovereignty India was hoping to gain from the ocean sector.
Companies involved in the manufacturing of electric vehicles (EVs), electronics, windmills, and others would also be trapped in this cycle of foreign dependency to foreign players, and would have to buy back these processed inputs at much higher prices, eventually leading to inflated production costs, and reduced international competitiveness.
The Path Forward
The United States, which is not a member state of ISA, has already set in motion a process for applying for deep-sea mining licenses via the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In fact, TMC – which triggered the two-year rule —has been filing for deep-sea commercial recovery permits under U.S. law by creating a U.S. based subsidiary to apply on its behalf. Since the US is not a member state, it does not recognise UNCLOS, or ISA, and so does not recognise the ISA’s monopoly over international mining legislation. Under US law, an American company can conduct mining activities so long as they meet US environmental, safety and operational standards.What this move proves is that ISA might lose its role as central rule-maker, and that alternatives to ISA-led governance are no longer hypothetical. There is, however, a powerful counter-movement growing —37 nations, various scientific bodies and tech corporations are calling for a moratorium. Hence, even if countries are able to come up with an alternative or national legislation, the nation may face intense legal backlash.
This leaves India in a prime position to broker a middle path. As a major voice for the Global South and an active ISA stakeholder, India could leverage platforms like Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) to advocate for unified environmental standards for marine exploration and exploitation, benefit-sharing, and distribution of the extracted minerals. However, realistically, this might be virtually impossible – the US is not a member state of UNCLOS, and Japan, India and Australia’s mining ambitions vastly differ from each other. Hence, India's most realistic role could be to demonstrate whether a state can meet its mineral demands without destroying the marine environment, while still following the international rules.
About the Author: Ananya WarrierAnanya Warrier is a third-year student at Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune. She has an interest for geopolitics, international relations and writing.
